Utah v. Small : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1990
Utah v. Small : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General of the State of Utah.
G. Fred Metos; Stephen R. McCaughey; Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Small, No. 900382 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2759
* r,T>»TP / 7 OF APPEAL! 
t 
DQCt GKET N O . / ; 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
LEMUEL T. SMALL, 
D ef endant/Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 900382-CA 
Priority No. 2 
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY 
THE HONORABLE GEORGE E. BALLIF, JUDGE PRESIDING 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General for the 
State of Utah 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1022 
G. FRED METOS - 2250 
STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY - 2149 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
72 East Fourth South, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-6474 
FILED 
SEP 17 1991 
SOURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
LEMUEL T. SMALL, 
Defendant/Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 900382-CA 
Priority No. 2 
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY 
THE HONORABLE GEORGE E. BALLIF, JUDGE PRESIDING 
G. FRED METOS - 2250 
STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY - 2149 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
72 East Fourth South, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-6474 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General for the 
State of Utah 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1022 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 6 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 7 
ARGUMENT 7 
POINT I 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
UTAH PRECLUDES THE USE OF ROADBLOCKS. 
ANY EVIDENCE SEIZED AT SUCH A STOP MUST BE 
SUPPRESSED 7 
THE ROADBLOCK IN THIS CASE WAS CONDUCTED 
WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF LAW 9 
B. 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
UTAH REQUIRES INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION TO 
JUSTIFY A SEIZURE OF APPELLANT'S PERSON 11 
A BALANCING OF INTERESTS RESULTS IN THE 
CONCLUSION THAT THE ROADBLOCK STOP IN 
T H I S C A S E W A S U N R E A S O N A B L E . 
CONSEQUENTLY, THE STOP VIOLATES ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 14 
i 
D. 
SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE IS THE PROPER 
REMEDY FOR A VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 16 
POINT II 
THE ROADBLOCK STOP OF THE VEHICLE IN 
WHICH APPELLANT WAS RIDING VIOLATED THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT 16 
POINT EI 
ANY CONSENT GIVEN TO SEARCH THE VEHICLE 
LACKED ATTENUATION FROM THE INITIAL 
ILLEGAL STOP, MAKING THE EVIDENCE SEIZED 
INADMISSIBLE 20 
CONCLUSION 24 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 25 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
Brown v. Illinois, 442 U.S. 590 (1975) 21 
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) 17, 18, 19, 20 
Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 502 A.2d 221 (Pa. Super. 1985) 12 
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) 8 
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 2481 
(1990) 17, 18, 19, 20 
Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 743 P.2d 692 (Or. 1987) . . 10, 13, 16 
State v. Anderson, 304 Or. 139, 743 P.2d 7155 (Or. 1987) 10 
State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153 (Ut. App. 1989) 21 
State v. Barcia, 549 A.2d 491 (N.J. Super. 1988) 15 
State v. Boyanovsky, 304 Or. 131, 743 P.2d 711 (Or. 1987) 10, 13 
State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986) 8 
State v. Henderson, 114 Ida 293, 756 P.2d 1057(Ida. 1988) . . 11, 13, 15, 16 
State v. Tewett, 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985) 8 
State v. Kitchen, 808 P.2d 1127 (Ut. App. 1991) 7, 17, 18, 19, 20 
State v. Koppel, 499 A.2d 977 (N.H. 1985) 14, 16 
State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Utah App. 1987) 8 
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) 9, 16 
State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987) 13 
State v. Parms, 523 So.2d 1293 (La. 1988) 13 
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Ut. App. 1988) 13, 21 
State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 144 (Ut. App. 1991) passim 
State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okla. 1984) 11 
State v. Thompson, 801 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991) 16 
iii 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS CITED 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution passim 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution passim 
Utah Code Annotated §23-20-19 (1953 as amended) 9 
Utah Code Annotated §41-l-17(c) (1953 as amended) 9 
iv 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
V . 
LEMUEL T. SMALL, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 900382-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF TURISDICTION 
This appeal is made pursuant to Rule 26(2)(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
This court has appellate jurisdiction in this case pursuant to Title 78, Part 2a, 
Section 3(2) of the Utah Code (1953 as amended). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal of right from a final judgment of conviction for the 
offenses of Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a 
Second Degree Felony; Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to 
Distribute, a Third Degree Felony; and Possession of a Controlled Substance, a 
Third Degree Felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
Did the roadblock stop of the vehicle in which appellant was riding 
which resulted in the discovery of controlled substances and firearms, violate his 
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right to be free from warrantless and unreasonable searches and seizures as 
described in Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah? 
Did the same roadblock stop violate appellant's right to be free from 
warrantless and unreasonable searches and seizures as described in the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution? 
Was there sufficient attenuation between the illegal roadblock stop and the 
consent to search the vehicle to relieve the seized evidence of the taint from the 
initial stop? 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah: 
The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches ana seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported 
by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects aeainst unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not oe violated and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
Utah Code Annotated, §41-l-17(a) through (d) (1953 as amended): 
The [State Tax] commission, and such officers and 
inspectors of the department as it shall designate, peace 
officers, state patrolmen, and others duly authorized by 
the department, or by law shall have power and it 
shall be their duty: 
(a) To enforce the provisions of this act and of 
all the laws regulating the registration or operation of 
vehicles or the use of the highways. 
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(b) To make arrests upon view and without 
warrant to any violation committed in their presence of 
any of the provision of this act or other law regulating 
the operation of vehicles or the use of the highways. 
(c) when on duty, upon reasonable belief that 
any vehicle is being operated in violation of any 
provision of this act or of any other law regulating the 
operation of vehicles to require the driver thereof to 
stop, exhibit his driver's license and submit to an 
inspection of such vehicle, the registration plates and 
registration card thereon. 
(d) To inspect any vehicle of a type required to 
be registered hereunder in any public garage or repair 
shop or in any place where sucn vehicles are held for 
sale or wrecking, for the purpose of locating stolen 
vehicles and investigating the title and registration 
thereof. 
Utah Code Annotated §77-7-15 (1953 as amended): 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place 
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense and may 
demand his name, address and an explanation of his 
actions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant was originally charged in a twelve count information alleging 
the commission of six felonies and six misdemeanors. (R. 3). Ultimately, 
appellant was tried on a three count amended information alleging two counts 
of Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute 
(methamphetamine and marijuana) and one count of Possession of a Controlled 
Substance (cocaine). (R. 150-151). Prior to trial, appellant and his co-defendant 
made a motion to suppress evidence. (R. 26-29). It was alleged that the 
evidence was seized in violation of Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of 
Utah and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
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Constitution. (R. 88-131). That motion was denied after a hearing at which 
evidence was submitted on the preliminary hearing transcript. (R. 87). Evidence 
was also taken by the court to supplement that transcript. (Tr.MS. 1-33).1 In a 
written order, the motion to suppress was denied. (R. 68-71). Appellant was 
tried and convicted by a jury. (R. 195). 
On September 29, 1988, law enforcement officers established a roadblock 
on the south Fillmore interchange of Interstate 15 in Millard County, Utah. (R. 
87 p. 6). The roadblock involved the combined efforts of the Utah Highway 
Patrol, the Sevier County Sheriffs Office and the Millard County Sheriffs Office. 
(R. 87 p.6). The roadblock was conducted under the direction of Millard 
County Sheriff, Ed Phillips. (Tr.M.S. p. 9). There was no written plan for the 
roadblock. The stated purpose for the roadblock was to conduct driver's license, 
registration and safety inspections of vehicles. (R. 87 p. 6) (Tr.M.S. p. 6)2. 
The officers manning the roadblock received verbal instructions from 
Sheriff Phillips, Sergeant Paul Mangleson of the Utah Highway Patrol and Phil 
Barney of the Sevier County Sheriffs office. (R. 87 pp. 33, 46-48).. Sheriff 
Phillips instructed the officers to ask all people who were stopped to produce a 
driver's license and vehicle registration. (R. 87 p. 47). Sergeant Mangleson 
instructed the officers to look for objects in the vehicles that had been stopped 
aThe transcript of the motion to suppress held on August 4, 1989, shall be 
designated "Tr. M.S.". 
2Due to the heavy flow of traffic, the officers manning the roadblock found 
it to be impossible to conduct safety inspections of the vehicles stopped at the 
roadblock. (Tr.M.S. p. 15). 
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that should arouse suspicion. (R. 87 p. 46). Phil Barney instructed the officers 
to look for suspicious clues in the body language of people stopped at the 
roadblock. (R. 87 p. 47). It was conceded that one of the purposes of the 
roadblock was to stop vehicles and look for such suspicious objects or 
circumstances. (Tr.M.S. p. 19). The roadblock was advertised in the local 
Millard County newspaper. (R. 87 p. 41). To warn travelers, signs were placed 
on the freeway. (R. 87 p. 7). The record does not reflect where those signs were 
located in relation to the roadblock. Nor does the record indicate what was 
written on the signs. 
At about 11:30 a.m. on September 19, 1988, officers at that roadblock 
stopped a vehicle driven by the co-defendant, Dennis Shoulderblade. (R. 87 p. 
7). Appellant was seated in the front passenger seat of the vehicle. (R. 87 p. 
8). Deputy Millard County Sheriff, Jeff Whatcott, requested the vehicle 
registration and license of the driver of the vehicle. (R. 87 p. 9). Shoulderblade 
produced a driver's license and appellant produced the registration. (R. 87 p. 8-
9). The vehicle was registered to Russell Clarence. (R. 87 p. 9). Appellant 
indicated that the vehicle belonged to a friend. (R. 87 p. 9). Appellant was 
requested to produce identification. (R. 87 p. 9). As he pulled out his wallet, 
Deputy Whatcott observed appellant shove a clear ziplock plastic bag between 
the seats. (R. 87 p. 9-10. The deputy then questioned the two about where 
they had been (R. 87 p. 10), and if they possessed any alcohol, firearms or 
controlled substances. (R. 87 p. 11-12). Appellant and Shoulderblade indicated 
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that they had been to Las Vegas (R. 87 p. 10) and were not in possession of any 
of the contraband listed by the deputy. (R. 87 p. 11-12). 
Deputy Whatcott then requested to search the vehicle. (R. 87 p. 12). The 
occupants acquiesced to that request. (R. 87 p. 12). Shoulderblade exited the 
vehicle and a loaded firearm was located under the driver's seat. (R. 87 p. 12). 
Whatcott then asked appellant if there were other firearms located in the 
vehicle. (r. 87 p. 13-14). Appellant produced two loaded revolvers. 
Shoulderblade and appellant were placed under arrest. (R. 87 p. 24). A further 
search of the vehicle resulted in the discovery of another firearm (R. 87 p. 28), 
eight ounces of methamphetamine, (R. 87 p. 22), six pounds fourteen ounces of 
marijuana, (R. 87 p. 25-26), a small quantity of cocaine (R. 87 P. 26-27) and three 
thousand seven hundred fifty dollars in currency. (R. 87 p. 23). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The roadblock stop in Millard County violated appellant's right to be free 
from warrantless and unreasonable searches and seizures as described in Article 
I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah. The officers had no statutory authority 
to make such a stop. Prior to the stop, the officers lacked any individualized 
suspicion that any criminal offense had been committed. The State showed 
neither that the roadblock significantly advanced the public interest in law 
enforcement nor that there were less intrusive means available to advance that 
interest. Consequently, the evidence seized as a result of this constitutional 
violation should have been suppressed. 
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The stop at the Millard County roadblock violated appellant's right to be 
free from warrantless and unreasonable searches and seizures as described in the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The roadblock in question 
was not carried out pursuant to a plan designed by neutral and politically 
accountable authorities. Furthermore, there was not a grave public concern that 
was advanced by the roadblock. There was no evidence to indicate how the 
seizures of vehicles of the roadblock advanced any public interest. Finally, the 
roadblock created a severe interference with the individual liberties of those who 
were stopped. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue of the constitutionality of a roadblock stop is a matter of law. 
Matters of law may be reviewed without deferance to the trial court. State v. 
Sims, 808 P.2d 144 (Utah App. 1991). Conclusions of law have been reviewed 
under a "correction of error" standard. State v. Kitchen, 808 P.2d 1127 (Utah 
App. 1991). Both of these standards are the same. Questions of law are 
reviewed de novo by appellant courts. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF UTAH PRECLUDES THE USE OF 
ROADBLOCKS. ANY EVIDENCE SEIZED AT SUCH 
A STOP MUST BE SUPPRESSED. 
Both the court and the Utah Supreme Court have expressed concern with 
the Fourth Amendment rulings of the federal courts in vehicle search cases. As 
an alternative, both courts have encouraged counsel to litigate these issues under 
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Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah. State v. Earl 716 P.2d 803 
(Utah 1986); State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Utah App. 1987) (Billings, J. 
dissenting).3 In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), Justice O'Connor 
encouraged state courts to decide search and seizure issues on state 
constitutional grounds rather than resorting to a Fourth Amendment analysis. 
Furthermore, it is also beyond question that a State Constitution may provide 
greater protections to individuals than does the Federal Constitution.4 
In State v. Earl supra, the court suggested that the analysis described in 
State v. Tewett, 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985), be applied to an interpretation of Article 
I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. Roadblocks have been held to be 
unreasonable seizures of the person on state constitutional grounds.5 There are 
three basic reasons given for this result: First, law enforcement agents lack 
statutory authority to conduct a roadblock6; second, an individual cannot be 
detained without a showing that the officer has an individualized suspicion that 
a crime has been committed; and third, a balancing of the interests involved in 
a roadblock stop indicate that such stops are unreasonable seizures of the 
person. 
3For an extensive discussion of the background of this particular issue see: 
Davis and Wallentine, A Model for Analyzing the Constitutionality of Sobriety 
Roadblock Stops in Utah, 3 B.Y.U.J. of Pub. Law 357 (1989). 
4See footnote 3. 
'Those cases will be discussed, infra. 
6See: State v. Sims, supra, and Point LA. infra. 
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A. 
THE ROADBLOCK IN THIS CASE WAS 
CONDUCTED WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF LAW 
In State v. Sims, supra, this court held that a roadblock conducted without 
a specific legislative authorization violated Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. The court found that the state supreme court in State v. Larocco, 
794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990), announced a policy requiring a neutral authority to 
authorize police to make seizures on less than probable cause. The court noted 
that in situations that do not involve exigent circumstances, the judicial branch 
of the government generally acts as the neutral authority. 
In other circumstances it was recognized that the legislature has 
authorized stops based on less than probable cause.7 The court reasoned that in 
such circumstances the legislature weighs the need for suspicionless stops 
against the degree of intrusion. Since the legislature essentially involves the 
citizens of the state acting through elected representatives, such decisions involve 
a high degree of political accountability. In Sims, the court found that the 
authorization for the roadblock came solely from law enforcement agents. That 
resulted in the court concluding, 
Consistent with our supreme court's emphasis on 
the warrant requirement, then, we hold that 
suspicionless, investigatory motor vehicle roadblocks, 
conducted without legislative authorization, are per se 
unconstitutional under article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
808 P.2d at 149. 
7The court cited brief warrantless stops made pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§41-1-17(c) (1953 as amended) and fish and game roadblocks made pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §23-20-19 (1953 as amended), as examples of such 
authorization. 
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Several other state courts have reached the same conclusion regarding the 
need for express statutory authority for law enforcement officers to conduct a 
roadblock. The Supreme Court of Oregon addressed this issue in the context of 
a civil suit for damages by a plaintiff who was stopped at a roadblock. Nelson 
v. Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 743 P.2d 692 (Or. 1987). Two other criminal cases 
involving similar roadblocks were addressed by that court at that time: State v. 
Bovanovsky, 304 Or. 131, 743 P.2d 711 (Or. 1987), and State v. Anderson, 304 
Or. 139, 743 P.2d 715 (Or. 1987). In Nelson v. Lane County, supra, the state 
sought to uphold the use of a roadblock on the basis that such a seizure was 
constitutionally authorized. 
In Nelson, the state maintained that it had statutory authority to conduct 
a roadblock under a general statute that gave law enforcement agencies the 
authority to enforce the criminal law. The state claimed that the statute 
implicitly authorized roadblocks and that the roadblock in question was 
conducted in accordance with "The Oregon State Police Patrol Manual." In 
rejecting this argument, the court reasoned, 
By and large, agencies of the executive branch 
are free to carry out their assigned responsibilities in 
ways of their own choosing. Making explicit the 
manner in which any aeency is to accomplish its task 
falls to the agency heaa or that official's designee to 
instruct or sub-delegate to subordinated officials. 
However, some procedures may invade the 
personal freedoms protected from government 
interference by the constitution. Roadblocks are 
seizures of the person, possibly to be followed by a 
search of the person or the person's effects. For this 
reason, the authority to conduct roadblocks cannot be 
implied. Before they search or seize, executive agencies 
must have explicit authority from outside the executive 
branch. 
743 P.2d at 695. 
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Similarly, in State v. Henderson, 114 Ida. 293, 756 P.2d 1057 (Ida. 1988), 
the Supreme Court of Idaho held that its constitutional provision prohibiting 
warrantless and unreasonable searches and seizures required express legislative 
authority to conduct a roadblock. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals 
found roadblocks to be unreasonable under similar provisions of the Oklahoma 
Constitution. One of the justifications for the court's decision was that officers 
lacked statutory authority to make such stops. State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 
(Okla. 1984). 
In this case, the only authorization for the roadblock came from law 
enforcement. The procedures and conduct of this and the Sims roadblock were 
virtually identical. The two were conducted approximately sixty days apart. 
The Sims roadblock was located in adjoining Juab County and it was on the 
same interstate highway as the roadblock in this case. This court's ruling in 
Sims should govern the roadblock in this case. This court should hold that the 
roadblock stop of the vehicle in which appellant was riding violated Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
B. 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF UTAH REQUIRES INDIVIDUALIZED 
SUSPICION TO JUSTIFY A SEIZURE OF 
APPELLANTS PERSON 
In Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 502 A.2d 221 (Pa. Super. 1985), the Superior 
Court of Pennsylvania discussed the propriety of roadblock stops under the 
Pennsylvania Constitution. The Pennsylvania legislature had previously enacted 
a statute allowing law enforcement agencies to utilize roadblock stops for the 
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purpose of checking vehicles, drivers or documents. The defendant in Tarbert 
had been convicted of driving under the influence as a result of a roadblock 
stop. The court reviewed the case law on roadblocks and noted: 
Courts upholding the constitutionality of roadblocks are 
not unmindful of their intrusiveness, but rather, stress 
that careful control and absence of discretion can bring 
the use of the roadblock within the Fourth Amendment. 
Commonwealth v. Tarbert, supra, at 225. With respect to this reasoning, the 
court held: 
While the arguments supporting the constitutionality of 
systematic roadblocks are persuasive, the rationale 
supporting them is flawed. JMO amount of control or 
limited discretion can justify the "seizure" that takes 
place in the complete absence of probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion that a motor venicle violation has 
occurred. Certainly, the Constitution of our 
Commonwealth affords its citizens the right to be free 
from intrusions where one has a reasonable expectation 
or privacy. 
Ibid at 225-226. The court ultimately held that the Pennsylvania Constitution is 
violated when roadblock stops are not based on probable cause or on a 
reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed. 
The holding in State v. Henderson, supra, has previously been discussed 
with respect to the effect of the lack of statutory authority to conduct a 
roadblock. The Idaho Supreme Court went further in Henderson and held that 
under the Idaho Constitution, law enforcement officers are required to have 
individualized suspicion of criminal wrongdoing before a stop of a vehicle may 
be made. The Supreme Court of Oregon reached the same conclusion in State 
v. Boyanovsky, supra. Boyanovsky was the companion case to Nelson v. Lane 
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County, supra. It addressed a roadblock search resulting in a criminal 
conviction rather than a civil action against law enforcement authorities. The 
Supreme Court of Louisiana also concluded that there was a need for 
individualized suspicion to invade one's privacy under its state constitution. 
Consequently, a roadblock stop was held to be unconstitutional in Louisiana. 
State v. Parms, 523 So.2d 1293 (La. 1988). 
By statute, officers in Utah are required to have individualized suspicion 
of criminal activity before violating a citizen's privacy interest.8 Both the Utah 
Supreme Court and this court have required such individualized suspicion in 
addressing Fourth Amendment issues. State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 
1987); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988). The same requirement for 
individualized suspicion should also be applicable to Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution. 
In this case, the only reason for the stop of the vehicle in which appellant 
was riding was the roadblock. There was no probable cause or articulable 
suspicion to believe that appellant or the co-defendant, Shoulderblade, were 
engaged in any criminal conduct prior to the stop. For this reason, the stop of 
the vehicle in which appellant was riding violated Article I, Section 14 of the 
Constitution of Utah. 
See discussion in point LA. supra. 
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A BALANCING OF INTERESTS RESULTS IN THE 
CONCLUSION THAT THE ROADBLOCK STOP IN 
T H I S C A S E W A S U N R E A S O N A B L E . 
CONSEQUENTLY, THE STOP VIOLATES ARTICLE 
I, SECTION 14 OF THE, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
In determining the reasonableness of police action in relation to an 
interference with a privacy interest courts may apply a balancing test. State v. 
Koppel 499 A.2d 977 (N.H. 1985). In that case the propriety of a roadblock to 
investigate drunk driving under the New Hampshire Constitution was 
addressed. The court required that the following test be met: 
To justify the search or seizure of a motor vehicle, 
absent probable cause or even a reasonable suspicion 
that a criminal offense is being committed, the State 
must prove that its conduct significantly advances the 
public interest in a manner that outweighs the 
accompanying intrusion on individual rights. It must 
further prove that no less intrusive means are available 
to accomplish the State's goals. 
499 A.2d at 981. 
In applying that test, the court held that a roadblock is not an effective 
means of detecting or deterring drunk driving. The court described the 
significant number of vehicles stopped, the number of officers deployed at the 
roadblock and the very few arrests that were actually made. The court 
concluded that the public interest in deterring drunk driving offenses was not 
significantly outweighed by the intrusions caused by a roadblock. This is 
because the court found from the statistics introduced at trial that highly visible 
roving patrols made more arrests than were effected at the roadblock. The 
patrols involved about the same number of officers as were deployed at the 
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roadblock. Consequently, such patrols provided a less intrusive means to 
accomplish the State's goals. 
The Supreme Court of Idaho reached the same conclusion in State v. 
Henderson, supra. In that case the evidence indicated that officers on patrol 
would make more arrests than that number of officers deployed at a roadblock. 
The court concluded: 
Thus, the testimony of the two police officials most 
responsible for the roadblock show unequivocally that 
these warrantless searches conducted without any 
suspicion of criminal wrongdoing are less efficient than 
the normal stops based on probable cause. Therefore, 
roadblocks are an inefficient and unnecessary constraint 
on a person's right to remain free of search or seizure 
absent probable cause. 
[emphasis in the original] 756 P.2d at 1061. 
In this case, there was no evidence introduced that would demonstrate the 
effectiveness of a roadblock as opposed to other less intrusive means of 
investigation. However, the conclusion that can be reached from the case law is 
that roadblocks are not an effective means of law enforcement. The roadblock is 
not an efficient use of police manpower. Likewise, a roadblock creates a highly 
intrusive and inconvenient situation for the travelling pubic.9 For these reasons, 
roadblocks do not pass the balancing test employed by other state courts to 
determine the reasonableness of a stop that is based neither on probable cause 
9See also, State v. Barcia, 549 A.2d 491 (N. J. Super. 1988) where a 
roadblock on the New Jersey side of the George Washington bridge caused a 
traffic jam in New York City involving over one million of motor vehicles, and 
taking over four hours to unravel. The Court described the situation as a 
"traffic morass of monumental proportions." 549 A.2d at 497. 
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nor on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The State failed to produce any 
evidence tending to show the effectiveness of this particular roadblock. The 
state cannot meet the requirements of the balancing test employed in Henderson 
and Koppel. The only conclusion that can be reached is that the roadblock stop 
in this case was unreasonable and violated Article I, Section 14 of the 
Constitution of Utah. 
D. 
SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE IS THE PROPER 
REMEDY FOR A VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
In State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991), the attorney general's 
office issued investigative subpoenas in violation of Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution. Citing State v. Larocco, supra, the court held that exclusion 
of illegally obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of a violation of Article 
I, Section 14. This is the same conclusion that was reached by this court in 
State v. Sims, supra. The roadblock stop of the vehicle in which appellant was 
a passenger violated Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. The evidence 
seized as a result of that stop is subject to suppression. 
POINT II 
THE ROADBLOCK STOP OF THE VEHICLE IN 
WHICH APPELLANT WAS RIDING VIOLATED THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT 
In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, U.S. 110 S. Ct. 
2481 (1990), the Supreme Court upheld the use of roadblocks, or sobriety check 
points, in an effort to curtail a serious drunk driving problem. The roadblock 
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was operated pursuant to guidelines created by a state advisory committee. 
That committee was comprised of both law enforcement and citizens. The 
guidelines limited the time, location and procedures for such roadblocks to meet 
the problem of drunk driving. The court in Sitz then relied on a three prong 
balancing test established in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) to determine if a 
suspicionless stop violated the Fourth Amendment. That test requires a court to 
weigh the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to 
which the seizure advances the public interests, and the severity of the 
interference with individual liberty. In State v. Sims, supra, and State v. 
Kitchen, 808 P.2d 1127 (Utah App. 1991), this court determined that two 
roadblocks that were identical to the roadblock in the instant case, violated the 
Fourth Amendment. Although two different judges authored the opinions. The 
analysis employed in both cases was substantially the same. 
In Sims, Justice Greenwood focused on the need for the roadblock to be 
carried out pursuant to an established plan. The plan must include explicit 
limitations on the conduct of the officers. Furthermore, it must be developed by 
politically accountable officials, including people who are not involved with law 
enforcement. In Sims, Justice Greenwood held that the proof of the existence of 
such a plan is a prerequisite to the Brown balancing test. The roadblock in 
Sims was established and organized by the highway patrol and Juab County 
Sheriffs office. There was no explicit plan for that roadblock. Further, 
whatever plan existed was created solely by law enforcement. Consequently, 
the court held that the roadblock in Sims violated the Fourth Amendment. 
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Kitchen also involved a Juab County roadblock that was substantially the 
same as the roadblock in Sims. Justice Russon authored the panel decision and 
held that the roadblock in Kitchen was not conducted pursuant to an explicit, 
neutral plan as required by Sitz. It was also held that the roadblock failed to 
pass the balancing test established in Brown. With respect to the plan the court 
in Kitchen noted, 
Unlike the plan in Sitz, the plan before us was 
prepared by the actual officer who conducted the 
roadblock, rather than by a neutral body. We question 
the neutrality of any plan which is authored by the 
same person whose actions the plan is purported to 
limit. Secondly, the purpose of the plan in Sitz was to 
provide guidelines for trie conducting of roadblocks in 
general, whereas the plan before us was formed with 
this specific roadblock in mind. Thirdly, unlike the 
plan in Sitz, there is no evidence that the plan 
provided explicit guidelines, beyond the direction to 
stop only automobiles and light trucks. The guidelines 
in any plan must, at a minimum, be specific enough to 
prevent "arbitrary invasions" enacted "solely at the 
unfettered discretion of officers in the field." Brown, 
443 U.S. at 51, 99 S. Ct. at 2640. Clearly, Sergeant 
Mangleson's plan did not meet this minimum 
requirement. 
808 P.2d at 1130. 
With respect to the balancing test, the court in Kitchen first noted that 
one of the reasons for the roadblock was to curtail the drunk driving problem. 
This was found to satisfy the first prong of the Brown test. With respect to the 
second prong of the Brown test the court stated, 
However, the second prong of the Brown test, 
the degree to which the roadblock advances the public 
interest, has not been met. First, there was no finding 
as to whether this roadblock advanced the 
aforementioned public interest. Moreover, there is a 
paucity of evidence, empirical or otherwise, that this 
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roadblock accomplished any of the purposes for which 
it was conducted. In Sitz, in addition to data as to the 
number of arrests made, records were kept as to the 
number of vehicles stopped, the number subject to 
further investigation, ana the length of the delay 
involved. Here, only the number of violations were 
recorded. Additionally, in Sitz, expert testimony was 
received as to the effectiveness of roadblocks in 
advancing detection of drunk drivers; here, no such 
expert testimony was offered. In short, no evidence 
was offered or received to support a finding that this 
roadblock advanced the interests for which it was 
conducted and, therefore, this prone of the Brown test 
has not been met. [emphasis in the original, footnote 
omitted] Id. at 1131. 
The court noted that the third prong of the Brown test need not be addressed 
since the roadblock had failed the second prong of the test. 
The roadblock in this case is indistinguishable from those employed in 
Sims and Kitchen. First, there was no explicit, neutral plan for the roadblock. 
It was based on a plan established solely by law enforcement. The plan 
consisted of stopping all vehicles, requesting a driver's license and registration, 
then looking for suspicious circumstances. It is obvious that the purpose of the 
plan was to stop all vehicles then gather evidence that the officers would not 
otherwise be entitled to receive. On this basis alone the roadblock fails to pass 
the Fourth Amendment requirements as established in Sitz, Sims and Kitchen. 
The roadblock in this case also fails the Brown balancing test. The stated 
purpose of the roadblock was to perform safety license and registration checks 
of vehicles travelling on the interstate. However, Deputy Whatcott testified that 
the traffic became too heavy to conduct the safety inspections. (Tr.M.S. p. 19). 
He also testified that there was no particular problem with unregistered vehicles 
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or driver's license violations on the interstate. (Tr.M.S. p. 16). Consequently, 
there were little or no public concerns served by the seizures made of this 
roadblock. The second prong in Brown cannot be met by the evidence 
presented in this case. As in Kitchen, there was no evidence introduced on 
what the roadblock accomplished, the number of arrests made, vehicles stopped 
or the length of delay. Likewise, there was no expert testimony introduced as 
to the effectiveness of the procedure in this case. As for the final prong of the 
Brown test, there was a significant degree of intrusion. Appellant, a traveller on 
the interstate, was stopped virtually without warning and subjected to 
questioning about his travel itinerary and asked specific questions about 
contraband. The roadblock at issue in this case fails to meet both the Sitz and 
Brown requirements for suspicionless stops. Consequently, the roadblock stop of 
the vehicle in which appellant was riding violated the Fourth Amendment. 
POINT III 
ANY CONSENT GIVEN TO SEARCH THE VEHICLE 
LACKED ATTENUATION FROM THE INITIAL 
ILLEGAL STOP, MAKING THE EVIDENCE SEIZED 
INADMISSIBLE 
In ruling on the suppression motion in this case, the trial court held that 
the roadblock in question did not violate the Fourth Amendment and that the 
defendants consented to the search of the vehicle. (R. 68-71). At the time that 
the suppression motion was filed and decided the rule in Utah was that a 
voluntary consent purged the taint of a prior illegal stop. State v. Arroyo, 770 
P.2d 153 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988). 
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The Supreme Court of Utah reversed these rulings. The supreme court 
held that for evidence to be admissible as a result of a consent to search, the 
consent must be both voluntary and it must be attenuated from any prior illegal 
search. State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). In this case, appellant did 
not raise the attenuation argument at the trial court. However, since such a 
position was not available at the time the motion was heard, this argument may 
now be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Sims, supra. Furthermore, 
trial counsel moved to suppress all of the "fruits" of the initial illegal search. (R. 
26-29). Under the Arroyo attenuation analysis, the consent is the fruit of the 
illegal stop. 
To determine if a voluntary consent is sufficiently attenuated from a prior 
illegal stop or search, the courts require analysis of three factors that were 
initially described in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975). Those factors 
include: the temporal proximity of the primary illegality and the granting of 
consent, the presence or absence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose 
and flagrancy of the illegal police conduct. In State v. Sims, supra, the court 
analyzed these factors and found as a matter of law that the consent was not 
sufficiently attenuated from the initial illegal roadblock stop. For purposes of 
this attenuation analysis, the instant case and Sims are indistinguishable. 
With respect to the temporal proximity, the court in Sims found that a 
very short time had passed between the initial stop and the grant of consent. 
The highway patrol trooper in Sims had requested and inspected the defendant's 
driver's license and vehicle registration. He had questioned Sims about where 
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he had been and where he was going. The trooper then asked about the 
presence of alcohol, firearms and narcotics in the vehicle. During the 
conversation, the trooper had observed a partially full liquor bottle on the back 
seat of the vehicle. After the conversation the trooper requested and obtained 
the defendant's consent to search. 
On the issue of temporal proximity, the only difference between this case 
and Sims is that the deputy in the instant case observed a ziplock baggie rather 
than an open liquor bottle. The deputy in this case requested the registration 
and driver's licenses of the occupants, he engaged in exactly the same 
questioning as was done in Sims. Within an extremely short period of time, the 
occupants of the vehicle acceded to the officer's request to search. 
With respect to the question of intervening factors, the court in Sims held 
that such circumstances must be independent of the intervening illegality. The 
court noted that there was nothing in the encounter that would allow the 
defendant to believe that he was free to leave after the initial stop at the 
roadblock. The consent was obtained as a result of a request from the trooper. 
It was not volunteered by the defendant. The court in Sims concluded that the 
consent was obtained as a result of an unbroken chain of events beginning with 
the initial illegal stop. This case also involved an unbroken chain of events 
between the stop and the grant of consent. Those events, likewise included a 
request from the deputy for the consent to search the vehicle. 
With respect to the final factor to be considered, the court in Sims found 
that one of the purposes of the roadblock, drug interdiction, was a valid 
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consideration but was pursued by unauthorized means. The court held that 
officers involved in conducting the roadblock, including Highway Patrol 
Sergeant Paul Mangleson, were experienced officers who would be properly 
charged with the awareness that their conduct was not authorized by law. The 
court also noted that using ten to twelve local officers to staff a roadblock in a 
rural county may have left other parts of that jurisdiction with delayed police 
assistance in the event of need. The roadblock in this case was likewise 
established in a rural county. Sergeant Mangleson was also one of the 
organizers and instructors of the officers manning the roadblock. Finally, the 
stated purpose of the roadblock-license, registration and safety checks-appeared 
to be a ruse to make observations and obtain evidence from drivers that could 
not be obtained without violating the Fourth Amendment. 
The roadblock stop in this case was closely related in time to the consent 
to search. The consent was the result of an unbroken chain of events that 
began with the roadblock stop. Finally, there is nothing in the purpose or 
nature of the roadblock that would relieve the taint from the prior illegal stop. 
Consequently, the consent to search was not sufficiently attenuated from the 
initial illegal stop to make the evidence admissible. 
The evidence seized as a result of the illegal roadblock stop of the vehicle 
in which appellant was riding must be ordered suppressed. The court below 
committed error by allowing that evidence to be admitted at trial. The evidence 
establishing the three offenses for which appellant was convicted was that same 
23 
evidence which is subject to suppression. Consequently, the failure of the trial 
court to order the evidence to be suppressed was prejudicial error. 
CONCLUSION 
The roadblock stop of the vehicle in which appellant was riding violated 
both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. Any consent to search the vehicle was not 
sufficiently attenuated from that stop to make the evidence admissible. The 
evidence seized as a result of the search of that vehicle should be ordered 
suppressed. Since the admission of that evidence at trial was prejudicial, this 
court should further order a new trial where the inadmissible evidence will not 
be introduced. 
DATED this day of September, 1991. 
STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY 
Attorney for Appellant 
G. FRED METOS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
******* 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LEMUEL THOMAS SMALL, and DENNIS 
SHOULDERBLADE, 
Defendants. 
Case Number 88-2413 
RULING 
******** 
This matter came before the Court on the 4th day of 
August, 1989 on defendant's motion to suppress. The parties 
proffered certain testimony, a witness was called and testified, 
and counsel presented their arguments to the Court. The Court, 
having taken the matter under advisement, and having diligently 
considered all of the evidence before it, now enters this: 
RULING 
On September 29, 1988, the Utah Highway Patrol, in 
conjunction with the Millard County Sheriff's Office conducted a 
roadblock on a flat section of Interstate Highway 15, south of 
Fillmore. Notice of the checkpoint was duly given one week 
before in the local newspaper of general circulation. Prior to 
setting the roadblock, the officers were briefed and instructed 
to check for proper driver's license and vehicle registration. 
Appropriate signs were placed, announcing the checkpoint at some 
distance in front of the block. 
During the roadblock, all cars were stopped. Pursuant 
to the roadblock, defendants were stopped. During the stop, the 
officer present observed defendant Small shove a plastic bag 
between the front seats of the car. The officer checked both 
defendants' identification and determined that the car was not 
registered to either defendant. While awaiting confirmation from 
dispatch regarding registration, the officer asked defendants 
whether there were any firearms, alcohol, or drugs in the car. 
The response was in the negative. The officer then requested 
permission to search the vehicle. Consent was given. 
As defendant Shoulderblade exited the car, the officer 
noticed a gun under the front seat. Subsequent search of the 
passenger compartment of the vehicle revealed a substantial 
quantity of drugs, drug paraphernalia, money, and loaded 
firearms. In the course of the search of the passenger 
compartment, the officer asked defendants if they knew anything 
about the firearms or the drugs. Defendants responded in the 
negative. They were subsequently arrested and were apprised of 
their rights before any further attempt at questioning. 
As the officer searched the passenger compartment of 
the vehicle, he smelled what he believed to be raw marijuana. He 
subsequently, opened the trunk and found more drugs and 
paraphernalia. 
The evidence presented indicates that the roadblock was 
properly instituted at a fixed point as indicated in Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979). The checkpoint was located in 
a flat area and was highly visible. By allowing officers to 
check licenses and vehicle registration, advanced a legitimate 
governmental purpose as required in United States v. McFaydenf 
865 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
As further required in McFayden , there was no 
discretion on the part of officers stopping the cars—all were 
required to stop. While there is some question as to whether all 
of the large trucks were stopped at the roadblock, there was no 
clear testimony that they were not stopped. The court notes that 
the Tenth Circuit has ruled that letting certain vehicles through 
the roadblock unchecked is not, per se, an unlawful practice. 
United States v. Corral, 823 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1987). In any 
event, it is undisputed that all passenger vehicles were stopped. 
Questioning as part of an initial stop does not 
normally rise to the level of a custodial interrogation. The 
Utah Supreme Court has held that Miranda warnings are not 
required for investigation and interview pursuant to determining 
whether a crime has been committed. Salt Lake City v. Carrier, 
664 P.2d 1168, 1170 (Utah 1983). 
The factors required for a Miranda warning under Carner 
are not present. Here questioning as to the contents of the car 
was made as the officer awaited information from the dispatcher 
relative to vehicle registration. Questioning made during the 
search of the vehicle was not accusatory. Any interrogation if 
it can be called that was brief and informal. See Carner, at 
1171. The defendants were only detained after facts came to 
light during the check that created a reasonable suspicion that 
the occupants were engaged in some criminal activity (Carrier). 
The uncontroverted testimony is that the defendants were properly 
advised of their rights before further attempts at questioning. 
All of the above factors: notice of the stop, its 
location, legitimate purpose of the stop, training of the 
officers, the minimal intrusion by the officers unless there was 
an articulateble and reasonable suspicion, establish a minimum 
of public inconvenience. 
Defendants gave permission to search the vehicle. 
Consent was never withdrawn. As such, the subsequent search of 
the trunk was reasonable and proper. Even if the consent was 
somehow defective, (and there is no evidence that this is the 
case) this court believes that due to the evidence found in the 
passenger compartment and the smell of marijuana, the officer had 
probable cause to search the trunk space. See State v. Earl, 716 
P.2d 803 (Utah 1986) . 
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the 
vehicle stop, search, and subsequent arrest were properly 
administered. The Court therefore denies defendants1 motion to 
suppress. 
n 
DATED at Provo, Utah this ^ t day of August, 1989. 
GEORGE #T BALLIF, JUDGE / 
cc: Dexter Anderson / 
Milton Harmon 
Sumner Hatch 
